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A B S T R A C T   
We investigate the question of whether spending to enable ambitious EV roll-out programmes can in fact 
generate net gains across the wider economy. We use a multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model for the UK economy and focus on the need to upgrade electricity networks to support an initial EV 
penetration scenario for the period to 2030. We find that large scale spending and cost recovery for network 
upgrades is likely to result in net negative impacts on key macroeconomic indicators, including real income 
available for spending across all UK households. This is due to a combination of time-limited network upgrade 
activity in the presence of capacity constraints combined with the need for costs to be passed on to electricity 
consumers through higher bills. But the lowest income households – the group of greatest concern to policy-
makers – suffer the smallest losses. Moreover, the EV uptake delivers sufficient gains that deliver net positive 
impacts on all household incomes, with sustained expansion in GDP and employment across the economy. The 
key driver is a greater reliance on UK supply chains with the shift away from more import-intensive petrol and 
diesel fuelled vehicles towards electric ones.   
1. Introduction 
The UK and Scottish Governments have set ambitious targets for the 
roll-out of electric vehicles (EVs) by 2040 and 2032 (DEFRA 2017; 
Scottish Government (2017).1 These targets have been driven by the 
global recognition that EVs are a viable alternative to traditional fossil 
fuels vehicles and a key low carbon solution and technology for sup-
porting the transition to the decarbonisation of transportation (Euro-
pean Commission, 2014; IEA, 2017). Moreover, with the Paris 
Declaration on electro-mobility and climate change aiming to increase 
electric-mobility to levels compatible with a less than 2 C pathways 
(United Nations, 2015), advancing electrification of transport has 
become a stated priority for most countries. Electric Vehicles Initiative 
(EVI) member countries have taken renowned lead in this respect. For 
instance, Norway set national targets of new vehicles to emit on average 
85 g CO2/km by 2020 (Norway Government, 2014). Germany plans to 
roll-out at least 1 million electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles by 2020 as 
declared in the national electro mobility development plan (German 
Federal Government, 2009). The UK Government has set a target of at 
least 50% of new vehicles to be ultra-low emission by 2030 in the 
recently launched ‘Road to Zero Strategy’ (HM Government, 2018; Of-
fice for Low Emission Vehicles, 2018). 
But, if the EV roll-out is to play its intended role in supporting na-
tional priority of reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, it must 
gain support from a broad policy stakeholder community. In the paper 
we argue that a crucial element of this is demonstrating that the EV roll- 
out can contribute to unlocking, sustaining and increasing value in 
different parts of the economy. An obvious focus is locating the manu-
facture of vehicles and batteries ‘at home’. Our proposition is that a 
more straightforward source of wider economy value may result from 
EVs being fuelled by the domestic electricity industry, which may sup-
port more extensive domestic supply chain activity than petrol/diesel 
fuelling. We have previously argued this in a simpler economy-wide 
input-output (IO) multiplier framework (Turner et al., 2018). Here we 
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extend using multi-sector economy-wide computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) analysis to consider a fuller range of spending activities and 
market responses, which drive a range of distributional effects through 
income and price effects. 
Like any transformative low carbon solution and technology, EVs 
presents a variety of challenges for the vehicles industry, fuel station 
operators, electricity network and the government. In particular, the EVs 
roll-out will have profound impact on the electricity system that will 
require upgrade to the electricity network itself, which will carry sig-
nificant costs that are ultimately paid by consumers. Here we consider 
how consumers may be impacted both through energy bills and the costs 
of other goods and services (where electricity prices impact production 
costs). But we also investigate the extent to which benefits triggered by 
the shift to domestically fuelled (and increasingly more efficient) EVs 
may act to offset losses incurred. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a synopsis of the existing and emerging discourse and debate 
around EV roll-out. Section 3 sets out the core principles adopted in 
investigating the question of who pays and who benefits from the up-
grade of the UK electricity network infrastructure and associated EV roll- 
out. Section 4 details the CGE model specification and characteristics. 
Section 5 presents and explains our results. Conclusions and policy im-
plications are provided in Section 6. 
2. Background to questions around EVs in the literature 
Several studies have applied various methods to estimate the im-
plications and impacts of the roll-out of EVs. Some have largely focussed 
on the factors promoting and driving the shift to EVs, charging infra-
structure requirements, and the demand and/or consumer choice and 
behaviour of switching to alternative fuel vehicles (Egbue and Long, 
2012; Jacobson and Delucchi, 2011; Miesel and Merfled, 2018; Noel 
et al., 2017; Noel et al., 2019). Fernandez et al. (2011) focus on the 
impacts of different levels of plug-in EVs penetration on distribution 
network investment, evaluation of network reinforcement and incre-
mental energy losses. Lopes et al. (2011) evaluates the integration of EVs 
in the electric system and the grid control architecture and mechanism 
required. 
Other studies assess the potential economic cost and benefits of the 
EVs roll-out and the potential market penetration (Carlsson and 
Johansson-Stenman, 2003; Noel and McCormack, 2014; Schmelzer and 
Miess, 2015, Villar et al., 2013). Another strand of the literature focus on 
the environment impact and technical progress associated with EVs 
(Cames and Helmers, 2013; Choma and Uyaya, 2017; Neves et al., 
2018). 
Some authors highlight the need for active government support to 
incentivise and accelerate large-scale transition to EVs. These studies 
focus on using a combination of new and possibly innovative policy 
interventions and instruments, generally taxation and subsidies (See for 
examples Adderly et al., 2018; Lopez-Behar et al., 2019; Wang et al., 
2018). On the other hand, there may be a gap in the literature in this 
regard, given the attention that policymakers and regulators have been 
giving to both developing and implementing mechanisms that protect 
consumers against higher electricity bills (which in turn impacts income 
and spending) and different charging regimes and infrastructure 
(Ofgem, 2018). 
In terms of methodological approaches, most existing EV studies 
employ bottom-up models (e.g. optimization, statistical methods and 
simulation models) to consider the potential economic and technolog-
ical implications of EV uptake (Gnann and Plotz, 2015). These type of 
modelling frameworks are frequently used to analyse the impacts of 
integrating EVs with the electricity system/network, grid control design, 
type of charging infrastructure and vehicle efficiency to support EVs 
uptake and deployment (see for example de Rubens, 2019; Link et al., 
2012; Richardson, 2013; Tran et al., 2013). This is important as 
bottom-up models and methods have a key role to play in developing 
wider evidence base to enable a detailed understanding of the potential 
impacts of what are expected to be large-scale shifts towards electric 
vehicles in many countries. On the other hand, bottom-up approaches 
are more limited in terms of insights on a fuller range of indirect and 
economy-wide benefits that are of concern to the wider policy stake-
holder community (Turner et al., 2018). 
There are a number of studies that employ top-down models (e.g. 
input output and computable general equilibrium (CGE) methods) in 
investigating issues around EVs roll-out (see, for example, Figus et al., 
2018; Li et al., 2017; Hirte and Tscharaktschiew, 2013; Turner et al., 
2018). A common and generic consensus across most studies is that EVs 
roll-out will have both positive and negative impacts on the wider 
economy and vehicle users (Lemoine et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2019; Villar 
et al., 2013). Some of the positives impacts include; reducing vehicle 
operating cost, support to national and global CO2 emission reduction 
objectives; improved local air quality and the provision of a stable and 
sustainable electricity system (Noel and McCormack, 2014). On the 
other hand, the market barriers and disadvantages include, high prices; 
short drive ranges; long recharging times and an insufficient recharging 
infrastructure (Berkeley et al., 2018; O’Neil et al., 2019; Steinhilber 
et al., 2013; Vassileva and Campillo, 2017). 
2.1. Addressing the question of ‘who pays’, and ‘who gains’ 
In this paper we focus attention on the distribution of costs and 
benefits that may arise from the need for large scale spending to upgrade 
the capacity and resilience of the electricity network to enable the roll- 
out of EVs. In doing so we identify four underlying principles. 
First, certainly in a UK case, funding the necessary network upgrade 
spending by the electricity industry requires cost recovery through 
electricity bills. The industry standard is that the cost can be recovered 
over a relatively long timeframe (equating to the estimated lifetime of 
new assets). Although they may ultimately be recovered more directly 
from EV users as uptake increases, we assume that recovery of the total 
investment costs is spread evenly over the lifetime of the assets created 
by the investment and reclaimed through bills. 
Second, commercial electricity customers are likely to pass on their 
increased energy costs through their own output prices. Ultimately, this 
will ripple through to domestic consumers in prices of other goods and 
services. Where firms export their output, the impact on UK households 
may be less direct, emerging through the employment and income ef-
fects of any loss in competitiveness. 
Third, where capacity constraints exist across the economy, the 
process of upgrading the UK electricity network infrastructure through 
large scale investment could trigger further price increases and negative 
wider economy impacts as different sectors involved draw in additional 
(but scarce) labour and capital resources. 
Fourth, the uptake of EVs enabled by the network upgrade could of 
course trigger a stream of benefits. Based on the findings of our previous 
work (Turner et al., 2018), in the UK case we hypothesise that a key 
source of benefits is likely to be economic expansion triggered by a shift 
in demand away from petrol/diesel (which has an import-intensive 
supply chain) towards electricity in fuelling vehicles, where the UK 
electricity industry has strong domestic supply chain linkages. More-
over, where EVs are more efficient, in terms of the cost per mile driven, 
this may further trigger a demand-driven stimulus as real incomes rise 
and purchasing power is freed up for spending on other goods and 
services. 
These basic principles are subject to practical complexity, particu-
larly in terms of the timeframe over which the required network 
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investment is carried out relative to the timing of the expected realisa-
tion of benefits through the EVs uptake. 
First, if we assume that producers are forward looking,2 in that they 
will recognise and anticipate when any large-scale investment is time 
limited to meet a particular requirement, this will influence both sec-
toral and market responses to that investment. Any major demand shock 
to the economy puts pressure on resources and prices. But if this is 
concentrated in a short timeframe (i.e. the investment boost is large but 
time-limited), the impact can be more disruptive as resources are first 
drawn away then released again, with the latter potentially triggering 
negative net impacts at sectoral and economy-wide levels. Where pro-
ducers anticipate this, they will be less willing to reallocate resources in 
the first place, which will dampen the expansionary process while also 
pushing up prices. 
In the context of the spending required to upgrade the electricity 
network to support the projected EV roll-out to 2030 for the UK, the 
potential for this type of ‘crowding out’ raises questions as to how the 
investment required should be spread. On the one hand, industry reg-
ulators may be cautious about creating new capacity too far ahead of the 
projected requirement in case that does not materialise, and/or it im-
pacts the efficiency with which existing capacity is used. On the other 
hand, particularly with capacity constraints relaxed over time, the 
disruptive impacts of the network investment on the wider economy are 
likely to be lessened if the spending and upgrade activity are spread over 
a longer timeframe in the lead up to 2030.3 
This leads us to a second point. By 2030 the expected UK EV pene-
tration is only anticipated to be 20% (Calvillo and Turner, 2019; Na-
tional Grid, 2018). It may then be argued that effective planning for a 
mass roll-out of EVs actually requires a continuous investment to meet 
desired penetration levels. Our sensitivity analysis (Section 5.3) con-
siders how the anticipation of further investment may impact 
supply-side responses to the initial phases of investment simulated here. 
However, there are questions as to how an ongoing programme of in-
vestment to support network upgrades would be planned for in practice. 
In the UK, network investment decisions are made on the basis of 5-year 
(previously 8-year) blocks which are referred to as ‘price control’ pe-
riods (Pearson and Watson, 2012; SPEN, 2018) – which are different for 
transmission and distribution parts of the industry - and set in the 
context of initial delivery of outcomes/benefits within the same block of 
time. A further complication is that supporting the EV uptake is not the 
only demand on the UK electricity network: investment may spread 
across different price control periods in order to consider wide low 
carbon electrification programmes and actions/options. 
3. Method 
We apply the UK-ENVI CGE model developed through various pre-
vious studies (e.g. Allan et al., 2007; Turner, 2009; Lecca et al., 2014; 
Figus et al., 2017, 2018). Specifically, we develop the variant applied by 
Figus et al. (2017) – with disaggregation of households by income 
quintiles – with further refinements made by Figus et al. (2018) to focus 
on the composition and efficiency of private transport. The model is 
calibrated on a 2010 social accounting matrix, SAM, for the UK (the 
most recent year for which appropriate data are available). In this sec-
tion we identify key elements of the UK-ENVI framework that govern the 
outcomes of simulation scenarios designed to consider the issues set out 
in Section 3. 
3.1. Simulation requirements 
Two stages need to be simulated. The first is the impacts of a 
spending and cost recovery programme to enable electricity network 
upgrades. We focus on a scenario – informed by Calvillo and Turner 
(2019) energy system simulations, in turn based on a National Grid 
(2018) scenario - that includes some extent of centralised and smart 
charging. This requires a total spend of £2.7billion to support 20% EV 
penetration by 2030. We assume that this may be spread over a 12 year 
period (2021–2032) or condensed in the 3 years immediately before 
2030 (2027–2029). 
In consultation with one of the UK network operators (SP Energy 
Networks) we have determined that only one-third of the total spend is 
likely to be made in the UK. All other equipment required are imported 
from the rest of the world (ROW). Thus, while UK (commercial, public 
sector and household) consumers must repay the total amount spent, 
over 45 years for the life span of the asset, only £900million of total 
spend is made in the UK. This is Scenario 1.4 
Scenario 2 involves adding and considering the impacts of the pro-
jected 20% EV roll-out. This involves adopting UK-ENVI specifications 
introduced by Figus et al. (2018), with adjustment to permit the adop-
tion of EVs. We develop this further using informed exogenous data 
(outputs of Calvillo and Turner, 2019 energy system scenario analyses) 
on a 20% EV penetration by 2030 uptake and gradual boost in the ef-
ficiency of EVs in using electricity to deliver private transport services 
(to 20% by 2030). 
3.2. Key elements of the model specification 
Figus et al. (2017, 2018) discuss in detail the fuller model specifi-
cation of the UK-ENVI. Here we adopt the same broad configuration, in 
terms of national fixed labour supply, forward looking producers, 
myopic consumers and export demand. This section focuses on key el-
ements of specification required to simulate the scenarios set out above. 
3.2.1. Production structure 
Fig. 1 illustrates the production structure in each of the 30 industries 
in the UK-ENVI framework. It reflects the classical KLEM nested constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, where the input 
decisions in each sector involve CES relationships between inputs of 
intermediate goods, labour and capital. In each sector, intermediate 
inputs and value-added produce total output. Intermediate inputs are a 
combination of energy and non-energy. Capital and labour form value- 
added. Energy is divided into electricity and non-electricity. 
To capture the impacts of EV roll-outs, a new and distinct industry; 
‘EVs Manufacturing’ is created within the industrial structure. This in-
dustry produces a designated output (i.e. EVs), therefore the total 
number of production sectors is expanded to 31 industries (see Table A1 
in Appendix A). However, the EVs Manufacturing industry has the same 
production structure as the original 30 industries, thus, the same labour 
closure and electricity price effects apply. Note that in identifying a ‘EVs 
Manufacturing’ industry we are in fact disaggregating the existing UK 
‘Motor Vehicles Manufacturing’ industry identified in the national ac-
counts. We do so by assuming that in the base year the production of EV 
constitutes 2% of total production of vehicles, while conventional petrol 
2 The impact of the reaction and response of forward-looking producers to 
investment decisions has been widely discussed in literature. The assumption of 
forward-looking consumers is also a key question of specification in the type 
CGE modelling approach adopted in this paper (see Lecca et al., 2013).  
3 This type of issue may form part of the concern expressed by the Committee 
on Climate Change (2019, p.182), where it is noted that “… networks will need 
to be upgraded in a timely manner and future-proofed to limit costs and enable 
rapid uptake of electric vehicles and heat pumps’’. 
4 In Scenario 1, we consider the impacts of the network upgrade on key 
macroeconomic variables including the impacts across different household 
quintiles. However, for Scenario 2, in the absence of required data on which 
household groups will purchase EVs, we switch off the household disaggrega-
tion element and consider a single representative household. In future research, 
we will prioritise capturing the impacts of increased EVs penetration on 
different household income groups. 
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and diesel vehicles are 98%. Crucially, we break out these vehicles 
manufacturing sectors to enable substitution between non-electric and 
new EV vehicles (as it rolls out) in the household consumption choice for 
private transportation. We return to this in more detail in Section 4.2.3. 
In our core scenario, we assume that all producers are forward 
looking and have perfect foresight. Capital stocks accumulate over time 
through investments. The investment decision follows Hayashi (1982), 
where maximization of the value of firms, Vt, is subject to a capital 





1 rt πt   It1 gωt subject to
_Kt  It   δKt (1)  
where πt denotes firms’ profits, It is private investment, gωt is the 
adjustment cost function, with xt  It/ Kt and δ is the depreciation rate. 
The solution of the problem gives the law of motion of the shadow price 
of capital λt and the adjusted Tobin’s q time path of investment (Hay-
ashi, 1982). In Section 5.3 we consider an alternative scenario where 
producers are myopic, and do not anticipate that the spending will end. 
This is motivated by the likelihood that continued spending on UK 
electricity network upgrades will be required to support a wider pro-
gramme of electrification, so that any reaction to an anticipated end to 
the programme may introduce negative effects that might not occur in 
practice. This involves replacing (1) with a simple capital stock adjust-
ment procedure, according to which investment in each time period 
equals depreciation plus some fraction of the gap between the desired 
and actual capital stock (see Lecca et al., 2013). 
3.2.2. Labour market 
We assume that the labour market is characterised by a fixed national 
labour supply (albeit with a pool of unemployed labour as reported in 
the base year data given by the SAM) and that the nominal wage is fixed. 
The motivation for this assumption is that recent labour market condi-
tions suggest that UK workers have not generally been in a position to 
effectively negotiate/bargain their wages in response to changing eco-
nomic conditions. We model wage setting with fixed nominal wage, 
which is determined as follows: 
wt  wt0 (2)  
where the nominal wage for the time period, wt is constant and un-
changing. In Section 5.3 we consider an alternative wage setting 
assumption, where wages are determined within the region in an 












where the bargaining power of workers and hence the real consumption 
wage is negatively related to the rate of unemployment (Blanchflower 




is the real after tax consumption wage, ϕ is 
a parameter calibrated to the steady state, ε is the elasticity of the wage 
rate with respect to the rate of unemployment, u, and takes the value of 
0.113 (Layard et al., 1991), and τt is the income tax rate which is fixed in 
the default setting. 
3.2.3. Consumption 
Fig. 2 represents the consumption structure in the model. Each 
household allocates consumption between household electricity, trans-
port and non-energy. In each time period consumption decision of each 
representative household is expressed in general form as 
Ch;t  Yh;t   Sh;t   HTAXh;t   CTAXh;t (4) 
In Equation (4),5 C denotes total consumption, Y income, S savings, 
HTAX income tax and direct taxes of consumption, CTAX. t denotes 
time, which is considered to be one year (given that underlying data are 
annual). We assume that consumers are myopic 6 and their intra-
temporal utility function is a nested CES, where at each node con-
sumption decisions depend on relative prices and on the elasticity of 
substitution as represented in Fig. 2. 
The main innovation here is within the transport level nest in Fig. 2, 
specifically how EVs enter the model. To simulate the required EV roll- 
out, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between electric (ET) 
Fig. 1. Production structure.  
5 Note that when the household disaggregation element is switched off the h 
index is removed.  
6 This means consumer base their spending decisions on current income 
available rather than on future discounted utility of consumption (see Lecca 
et al., 2013). 
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and fossil transport (NET) is zero in private transportation and Leontief 
demand functions are derived as follows: 
NETt  βNETt Tt  
ETt  aETt Tt (5)  
where T is total private transport, aETt is the share of electric transport 
consumed by households, and βNETt is the share of non-electric transport. 
So that aETt  β
NET
t  1.It is important to split total private transportation 
in this way to enable the choice of substitution in household decision for 
private transportation. Initially, aETt is calibrated to reflect the current 
share of EVs in total private transportation, which is assumed to be 
approximately 2%. However, over time, aETt is determined exogenously 
to simulate the increased penetration of EVs, simultaneously driving 
down the share of non-electric (conventional petrol/diesel) vehicles, 
βNETt . A crucial point to note here is that due to the Leontief specifica-
tion within the transportation nest the shares of conventional motor 
vehicles and EVs remain unaffected by fluctuation in the price of fuels, 
be it refined petroleum products or electricity. 
3.2.3. Impact of network improvement on prices 
For the simulations under scenario 1, the UK component of the 
spending to upgrade the electricity network to support the EV roll-out is 
introduced through an increase in exogenous final demand for con-
struction sector output. However, the full cost of this spending 
(including the larger imported share) is passed on to the consumers/ 
electricity users via higher electricity bills until the full investment cost 
is repaid. The repayment period levels to the lifetime of the new assets. 

















: Ct (7) 
Equations (6) and (7) are demand functions for electricity used by 
households for transport and for residential purposes respectively. In 
both expressions ELE is household demand for electricity. In (6) ET is 
electric transport, PET is the price of electric transport, and Pele is the 
price of electricity, δeleh is a share parameter and ρet is the elasticity of 
substitution between electric vehicles and electricity. In (7) C is total 
household consumption, CPI is the consumer price index, and ρc is the 
elasticity of substitution between the consumption of energy for resi-











1  ρEj ⋅VVENj;t (8) 
Similarly, in (8) VVele is electricity demanded by each industry in 
the economy j, AE is a productivity parameter, ρEj is the elasticity of 
substitution between electricity and non-electricity demand in produc-
tion, PE is the price of the composite good energy, and VVEN is indus-
trial demand of total energy. 
In the model the price of electricity is endogenous and is a function of 
all the other prices in the model. Agents pay the same price Pele as can be 
seen in equations (9) and (10). In order to increase the revenues from the 
sales of electricity and pay for the network upgrades, electricity sup-
plying firms increase the price Pele and introduce a mark-up as follows: 
Pelet Pelemct ⋅1 θt (9) 
Here Pelemc is the price of energy in a perfectly competitive and equals 
the marginal cost of producing and supplying electricity, and θ is a mark- 
up. The difference between the two prices gives us the marginal profit 
rate of the firm. 
mpt Pelet   Pelemct (10) 
If we multiply the marginal profit rate by the total revenue from 
selling electricity to firms and households (Qele we have the total profit 
which is set exogenously and equals the expenditure necessary to rein-











Fig. 2. Structure of consumption.  
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NTW is exogenously determined and equals the expenditure neces-
sary to upgrade the electricity network. When NTW is different from 
zero, the mark-up θ will increase by how much is necessary to get the 
marginal profit that is necessary to raise sufficient funding to pay for the 
network improvement. To simulate the increase in electricity price we 
substitute the price of electricity defined in equation (9) in (6) and (8) by 
setting 
P
tNTWt equal to £2.7billion. However, we assume that while the 
expenditure takes place in 3 or 12 years, the repayment is spread across 
45 years. In year 46, the price mark-up reduces to zero and the economy 
gradually approaches the long-run equilibrium. 
4. Simulation results 
4.1. Summary of scenarios simulated 
As noted above, we simulate in two stages. Scenario 1 focuses only on 
the impacts of the spending on electricity network upgrades that is 
required to support 20% EV penetration across the UK private trans-
portation fleet. That is, without the associated uptake of EVs actually 
taking place. We base the level of spending simulated on mixed charging 
scenario, which assumes that 60% of EV charging is decentralised so 
there is the need for more extensive distribution network reinforcement, 
while 40% of charging is centralised and therefore the need for distri-
bution network upgrade is limited. The scenario is informed by National 
Grid’s (2018) ‘Future Energy Scenarios’, with the £2.7billion investment 
required to support 20% EV roll-out by 2030 determined via an energy 
system (TIMES) model simulation reported in Calvillo and Turner 
(2019). 
As discussed in Section 3, the timeframe over which the spending on 
network upgrade takes place will affect the anticipated economy-wide 
impacts. Thus, we set out two sub-scenarios, Scenario 1a and Scenario 
1b. Scenario 1a assumes the spending takes place over the 12-year 
period between 2021 and 2032. Scenario 1b assumes that the entire 
spend and upgrade programme takes place within the 3-year period 
2027–2029. In both cases, the total £2.7billion cost, £900million 
(£0.9billion) of which is spent domestically (in the UK Construction 
sector), is recovered via electricity bills across a 45-year period from the 
first year of the investment (coincides with the life-span of the assets 
developed). See Table 1 for a summary of the breakdown and recovery 
of the investment spending. 
Scenario 2 – where Scenarios 2a and 2b incorporate the alternative 
investment timeframes in Scenario 1 – then introduces consideration of 
how the roll-out of EVs affects the anticipated impacts. Here, we assume 
that a gradually increasing percentage of EVs is used to meet the private 
transportation needs, replacing the conventional internal combustion 
engine vehicles fuelled with petrol or diesel. The EV penetration is 
assumed to start at 2% in 2021 and expand by 2% each year until it 
reaches 20% in 2030. We also incorporate increasing efficiency in the EV 
fleet. This reflects conditions in the Calvillo and Turner (2019) analysis 
from which we inform our CGE simulations. By increasing efficiency we 
mean that by 2030 EVs will be able to cover a 20% longer distance per 
unit of energy compared to what they can achieve now. We introduce 
this in step changes, where the efficiency of EVs improve, compared to 
present levels, by 11% in 2021, 16% by 2025 and 20% by 2030. 
4.2. Scenario 1: impact of £2.7billion spending on electricity network 
upgrade to support EVs roll-out on key macroeconomic variables, with 
£0.9billion spending in the UK construction sector 
Table 2 summarises key macroeconomic impacts for Scenario 1. The 
first four numerical columns reporting the case (Scenario 1a) where the 
network upgrade spending is spread across a 12-year period 
(2021–2032). We focus on 2021, the first year (short-run) impacts; 
2030, the year that the full 20% penetration is achieved; and 2040, ten 
years on. 2027 is introduced for purposes of comparison with the latter 
three columns, which report results for the case (Scenario 1b) where the 
network upgrade spending is spread across a 3-year period 
(2027–2029). All results in Table 2 are percentage changes relative to 
the base year (SAM 2010) values. 
The results show that the ‘demand shock’ of the £0.9billion spending 
in the UK Construction sector to enable the network upgrade, accom-
panied by the need to repay the £2.7billion (albeit over 45 years) causes 
some contraction in the economy from the outset. This is due to both the 
binding constraint on the labour supply (with only the pool of unem-
ployed labour providing excess capacity), the short-term constraint on 
capital, and the fact that forward-looking producers anticipate that the 
demand boost is time limited. The nominal wage is assumed fixed. This 
limits the negative impacts of the labour supply constraint. On the other 
hand, the user cost of capital is driven up as demand for the output of the 
Construction sector, and its upstream supply chain rise from the outset. 
This puts upward pressure on prices across the economy, as reflected in 
the CPI. Export demand contracts and there is a net decrease in output in 
all sectors except the Construction sector. 
The biggest negative shock in Table 2 is reported for 2030 when the 
spending is condensed in a 3-year time frame ending in that year (Sce-
nario 1b). Here, there is a contraction of 0.73% in the Electricity sector 
and a further 0.15% in all other sectors but Construction. This is offset 
only very slightly in 2030 as resources begin to shift away from that 
sector in anticipation of the end of the spending programme. By 2040 
the contraction eases, and more or less equalises over the two cases 
reported. Nonetheless (while it is not reported in Table 2), the cumu-
lative loss to UK GDP within the 2021–2040 timeframe is notably larger 
(£1.33billion) when the spending is condensed in a 3-year period under 
Scenario 1b relative to that when it is spread over 12 years 
(£0.87billion). 
A key policy concern at this stage is the impact on UK household 
incomes, and low-income consumers in particular. The results in Table 2 
show that household losses track or may exceed proportionate GDP 
losses. This is because, households bear a direct negative impact from 
the need to repay the network upgrade costs through their energy bills. 
This is reflected by the increase in the price of electricity being notably 
larger than the increase in the marginal cost of electricity (which itself is 
impacted by the pressure that the expansion puts on the user cost of 
capital). But Fig. 3 shows that the losses experienced by the lowest in-
come quintile are relatively small, with a limited gain in 2027 under the 
more condensed 3-year spending scenario (where the construction 
sector and its supply chain receive the biggest boost, which includes 
employment impacts). 
Generally, we find that UK households with higher incomes tend to 
lose more, both because of the greater absolute impact on what are 
higher energy bills overall, and the fact that they are more exposed to 
changing economic conditions through higher employment and capital 
ownership. 
4.3. Scenario 2: combined impact of £2.7billion spending on electricity 
network upgrade and 20% EV penetration by 2030 
For the second stage of our analysis, we introduce the additional 
impacts of the 20% EV roll-out being achieved by 2030. The combined 
impacts on key macroeconomic variables are shown in Table 3, the 
format of which corresponds to that of Table 2. 
Table 1 
Breakdown of investment spending and repayment.  
a b c d E 













£2,700m £60m £900m £75m £300m  
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Table 2 
Percentage change in key macroeconomic variables from a £2.7billion spending programme to upgrade the UK electricity network.   
Scenario 1a (12-year investment) Scenario 1b (3-year investment) 
2021 2027 2030 2040 2027 2030 2040 
GDP 0.000   0.001   0.002   0.006 0.004   0.014   0.007 
CPI 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.013 0.005 
User cost of capital 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.035 0.006 0.002 
Unemployment Rate   0.013   0.010 0.007 0.090   0.146 0.140 0.094 
Employment 0.001 0.001 0.000   0.006 0.009   0.009   0.006 
Import 0.002 0.003 0.001   0.004 0.016 0.003   0.004 
Export   0.003   0.008   0.008   0.006   0.010   0.022   0.007 
Electricity output   0.043   0.062   0.063   0.067   0.041   0.073   0.067 
Construction output 0.029 0.043 0.035   0.009 0.111 0.002   0.009 
All other output   0.002   0.004   0.005   0.007   0.002   0.015   0.007 
Price of Electricity 0.084 0.104 0.105 0.104 0.088 0.107 0.104 
Marginal cost of electricity 0.012 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.015 0.035 0.032 
Real household spending   0.002   0.003   0.004   0.007 0.003   0.013   0.007  
Fig. 3. Net change in per household real income of £2.7bn spending on electricity network upgrades.  
Table 3 
Percentage change in key macroeconomic variables from £2.7billion spending to upgrade the UK electricity network combined with the enabled 20% EV roll-out.   
Scenario 2 (12 year investment) Scenario 2 (3 year investment) 
2021 2027 2030 2040 2027 2030 2040 
GDP 0.007 0.080 0.101 0.102 0.085 0.088 0.101 
CPI 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.014 0.020 0.008 
User cost of capital 0.027 0.011 0.010 0.005 0.042 0.012 0.005 
Unemployment Rate   0.202   1.521   1.967   1.934   1.657   1.834   1.930 
Employment 0.013 0.097 0.126 0.123 0.106 0.117 0.123 
Import 0.032 0.016   0.021   0.030 0.029   0.020   0.029 
Export   0.022   0.020   0.009   0.008   0.022   0.023   0.009 
Electricity output   0.092 1.955 2.992 3.055 1.976 2.983 3.054 
Construction output 0.083 0.165 0.151 0.103 0.233 0.118 0.103 
All other output 0.001 0.065 0.086 0.087 0.067 0.076 0.086 
Price of Electricity 0.083 0.121 0.138 0.111 0.105 0.141 0.112 
Marginal cost of electricity 0.012 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.015 0.035 0.032 
Real household spending 0.003 0.048 0.062 0.061 0.054 0.053 0.061 
Household consumption of electricity   0.189 4.546 7.065 7.079 4.560 7.059 7.079 
Household consumption of refined fuels 0.004   10.582   16.785   16.810   10.573   16.792   16.810 
All other household consumption 0.012 0.025 0.026 0.023 0.033 0.018 0.023  
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The key result here is that introducing the EV roll-out enabled by the 
network upgrade generally results in a sustained net positive impact on 
GDP, total employment, and household spending. On the other hand, 
introducing the additional boost to domestic demand does put more 
pressure on the constrained economy in the early periods, so that the 
increase in the CPI is generally around double in Scenarios 2a and 2b 
relative to what is reported for Scenarios 1a and 1b, and the decrease in 
export demand is exacerbated. On the other hand, it is the sustained net 
boost in domestic demand through the roll-out of EVs that permits a 
sustained boost to GDP, employment and real household spending 
(where, the later includes a shifts from petrol and diesel to electric 
fuelling). 
Fig. 4 plots the trend and net impacts on key macroeconomic vari-
ables for the case where the network upgrade spending is spread over 12 
years (Scenario 2a). Note that the increase in real household spending 
always trails GDP expansion, given the need to continue to repay the 
network upgrade cost via higher energy bills. This is exacerbated by the 
fact that the uptake of EV increases demand for electricity, putting 
further upward pressure on both the price of electricity and the CPI. 
The change in the composition of economic activity is crucial, 
particularly in terms of the nature of the net employment gains deliv-
ered. Fig. 5 reflects the finding the greater reliance on domestic (UK) 
supply chains in supporting fuelling of electric rather than petrol and 
diesel cars is crucial in delivering important policy-relevant gains. In all 
periods, the greatest employment boosts are observed in the electricity 
sector itself and in public and private service sectors. The gross 
employment gains are maximised in 2040 at 3071 jobs and set against a 
gross sustained loss of 115 jobs in the same period, with the latter 
confined to the manufacture and fuelling of petrol/diesel vehicles and 
offset in other sectors. 
4.4. Sensitivity analysis 
As in any modelling analysis, we have made assumptions in our 
model that could potentially impact the magnitude and nature of some 
of the key policy-relevant variables and insights reported. Here, given 
that we observe a contraction in the economy when the ‘demand shock’ 
of the spending on network upgrades is introduced, we focus on two of 
the key assumptions governing the adjustment in capacity. 
First, as explained in Section 4, our assumption of forward looking 
producers (who have perfect foresight – see equation (1) in Section 4) 
means that resources begin to be reallocated before the spending pro-
gramme actually ends in all our scenarios. In Table 4, we report results 
where this assumption is relaxed so that producers behave in a myopic 
manner, not anticipating the end of the programme. This means they 
only reallocate resources after spending ends. 
Second, in the scenarios above, we assume that nominal wages are 
fixed. This limits the impact of constrained capacity by not allowing the 
nominal price of labour to rise as demand grows. On the other hand, it 
will also constrain any expansion as the incentive for unemployed la-
bour to join the workforce is limited. In Table 4 we report results where 
wages are determined using the bargained real wage function in equa-
tion (3). 
Taking the central case example of Scenario 2a, Table 4 shows that 
relaxing the central case assumptions in these two regards does have 
some impact on the quantitative results reported. As would be expected, 
the myopic producers results on the right of the table reflect a slightly 
larger expansion in the economy in all periods. Relaxing the assumption 
of fixed nominal wage rates has a less uniform impact. The results in the 
bottom half of Table 4 reflect a greater underlying contraction in 
response to the network upgrade spending and more limited expansion 
in response to the EV roll-out as upward pressure on wages exacerbates 
the impact of the constraints on capacity. But over time (here by 2040), 
the wage flexibility enables a greater expansion through industries being 
Fig. 4. Net impacts on wider economy of 20% EV penetration by 2030 and required sending on network upgrades (Scenario 2a).  
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better able to draw on the pool of unemployed labour. 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
Generally, the analyses presented here serve to demonstrate the need 
to shift focus from the technology and investment concerns associated 
with large new low carbon initiatives to focus on how the new activity 
enabled may unlock, sustain and increase value in different parts of the 
economy. In the case of enabling the first stage of EV roll-out in the UK 
presented here, our results reported raise questions as to whether we 
may have been missing a key source of value in terms of how we have 
fuelled our vehicles in the past. We have shown that a shift in household 
spending to fuel vehicles from more import intensive petrol and diesel 
towards the outputs of the more domestically integrated electricity in-
dustry, will generate multiplier effects that allow the economy to 
expand. On the other hand, our results show that the presence of supply 
constraints, particularly where the production side of the economy an-
ticipates that large-scale spending programmes are time limited, is likely 
to mean that gains in domestic activity are achieved at the cost of higher 
price levels and a drop in export demand. 
There are a number of ways in which the research presented here 
should be extended to yield important insights for policymakers. For 
example, if the network upgrades enable efficiency increases in energy 
supply, some of the negative prices effects observed in our results may be 
less extensive. But, at this stage, the initial results and analysis presented 
here allow us to draw a core policy-relevant conclusion. This is that UK 
Fig. 5. Net impacts on sectoral employment of 20% EV penetration by 2030 and required spending on network upgrades (Scenario 2a).  
Table 4 
Sensitivity analysis: Scenario 2a (spending on network upgrade combined with EV roll-out).    
Forward looking producers (central case) Myopic producers   
Macroeconomic variables 2027 2030 2040 2027 2030 2040 
Fixed nominal wage (central case) GDP 0.080 0.101 0.102 0.081 0.104 0.103 
CPI 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.007 
Unemployment Rate   1.521   1.967   1.934   1.539   2.005   1.943 
Employment 0.097 0.126 0.123 0.098 0.128 0.124 
Household real income 0.048 0.062 0.061 0.049 0.064 0.062 
Bargained real wage GDP 0.078 0.099 0.104 0.079 0.101 0.105 
CPI 0.014 0.014 0.006 0.014 0.014 0.005 
Unemployment Rate   1.484   1.939   1.965   1.493   1.957   1.972 
Employment 0.095 0.124 0.125 0.095 0.125 0.126 
Household real income 0.048 0.062 0.061 0.049 0.063 0.062  
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policy makers and industry need to consider how to capitalise on the 
type of wider economic returns to low carbon development, how the 
timing of spending programmes should be planned to maximise these, 
and how prevailing conditions in the wider economy may impact out-
comes. Our results clearly show that, even in the presence of capacity 
constraints, the ongoing EV roll-out and other low carbon initiatives are 
likely to deliver greater gains where domestic capacity can be fully and 
effectively utilised, and that the process may not overly disadvantage 
low income households. 
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